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Abstract
We study a natural model of coordinated social ad campaigns over a social network, based
on models of Datta et al. and Aslay et al. Multiple advertisers are willing to pay the host — up
to a known budget — per user exposure, whether that exposure is sponsored or organic (i.e.,
shared by a friend). Campaigns are seeded with sponsored ads to some users, but no network
user must be exposed to too many sponsored ads. As a result, while ad campaigns proceed
independently over the network, they need to be carefully coordinated with respect to their seed
sets.
We study the objective of maximizing the network’s total ad revenue. Our main result
is to show that under a broad class of social influence models, the problem can be reduced
to maximizing a submodular function subject to two matroid constraints; it can therefore be
approximated within a factor essentially 12 in polynomial time. When there is no bound on the
individual seed set sizes of advertisers, the constraints correspond only to a single matroid, and
the guarantee can be improved to 1 − 1/e; in that case, a factor 12 is achieved by a practical
greedy algorithm. The 1− 1/e approximation algorithm for the matroid-constrained problem is
far from practical; however, we show that specifically under the Independent Cascade model, LP
rounding and Reverse Reachability techniques can be combined to obtain a 1−1/e approximation
algorithm which scales to several tens of thousands of nodes.
Our theoretical results are complemented by experiments evaluating the extent to which
the coordination of multiple ad campaigns inhibits the revenue obtained from each individual
campaign, as a function of the similarity of the influence networks and the strength of ties in
the network. Our experiments suggest that as networks for different advertisers become less
similar, the harmful effect of competition decreases. With respect to tie strengths, we show that
the most harm is done in an intermediate range.
1 Introduction
Advertising is the most important and successful business model among social network sites. It
is widely believed that the adoption of products has a significant social component to it, wherein
people recommend products to each other, seek each other’s opinion on products, or simply see
others use a product. Under advertising campaigns on social networks, users are shown some ads
embedded in their newsfeed from friends; the advertisers’ hope is that the users will voluntarily
share the ads, or adopt the product and be observed by their friends using it.
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While models and algorithms for viral marketing have a long history of study (e.g., [12, 17, 16,
19, 21], and [8] for a survey), the focus in all of these works (and a much larger body of literature)
has been on campaigns to maximize the reach of a single product. When multiple products have
been considered, it has typically been in the context of competition, wherein each member of the
network adopts at most one product (e.g., [13, 18, 20]); though see [26] for a model wherein products
may exhibit complementarities.
Another very important way in which multiple products’ advertising campaigns interact was
articulated in two works by Datta, Majumder, and Shrivastava [11] and by Aslay, Lu, Bonchi,
Goyal, and Lakshmanan [3]. Both groups of authors observe that marketing campaigns interact in
that they involve displaying ads to the same set of users in a social network, and users should not
be shown too many ads, lest they feel too inundated with ads and leave the social network [25].1
More precisely, both sets of authors assume (explicitly or implicitly) that product exposure
comes in two forms: sponsored or user-shared. When a user’s friend willingly shares an ad, or the
user observes a friend using a product, this is perceived as genuine content. On the other hand, a
sponsored ad shown by the network itself is viewed as advertising. Both Datta et al. [11] and Aslay
et al. [3] thus impose a constraint on the number of sponsored ads that a user can be shown: the
number of sponsored ads shown to node v must not exceed a given bound rv. While only sponsored
ads are deemed “annoying,” advertisers do profit equally from sponsored or user-shared exposure.
Imposing tight constraints on the number of sponsored ads across ad campaigns, and solving the
corresponding optimization problem, should thus reduce the exposure of users to annoying sponsored
ads. If the coordinated optimization problem is solved well, then this reduction might be achieved
without much reduction in network profit. 2
Both Datta et al. and Aslay et al. study the network’s (here also called host) goal of maximizing
its own payoff (also called revenue), by carefully coordinating the ad campaigns of multiple adver-
tisers. In both models, the revenue that can be obtained from an advertiser j is constrained by the
advertiser’s “budget.” In the model of Datta et al., the advertiser pays the host for each user expo-
sure (sponsored or user-shared); however, the number of sponsored ads for advertiser j is bounded
by some number K(j). In the standard language of influence maximization (precise definitions are
given in Section 2), this translates to constraints on the seed set sizes of each advertiser. In con-
trast, Aslay et al. assume that the advertiser’s budget constrains the total payment for exposures;
if an advertiser with budget B(j) receives N exposures and is willing to pay γ(j) per exposure, the
network’s revenue is min(B(j), γ(j) ·N).
The advertisers’ hard budget constraints in the model of Aslay et al. raise an interesting question:
what happens if γ(j) · N > B(j), i.e., an advertising cascade reaches more network users than the
advertiser is willing to pay for? Aslay et al. [3] posit that the network views this negatively, and
incurs a regret over giving the advertiser free exposure.3 In their model, the network obtains regret
for undershooting the budget as well, this time over lost potential revenue. Their goal is then to
minimize the total regret. Because the regret is 0 only when the network exactly hits the advertisers’
1According to the 2012 Digital Advertising Attitudes Report [32], users may even exhibit negative responses
towards products if they receive too many advertisements.
2Whether users should be shown ads at all on social networks is an ethical and normative question beyond the
scope of our work. We take no position on whether social networking platforms should be considered public utilities,
financed by subscription fees, or by ad revenue. Our goal here is to limit users’ exposure to sponsored ads while still
providing high coverage to individual advertisers in the currently practiced model.
3A possible justification is that if this happens repeatedly, advertisers may learn to lower their declared budget
and pay less.
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budgets, a straightforward reduction from Partition style problems shows not only NP-hardness,
but also hardness of any multiplicative approximation.
In this article, we depart from the regret objective of Aslay et al. In particular, we do not believe
that a network incurs regret from accidentally giving advertisers free exposure. Such regret may
well be a psychological reality for humans, but it appears less applicable at the level of a major
company. In fact, an equally strong case could be made that giving advertisers free exposure is
beneficial, in that it makes the advertisers more likely to run future ad campaigns on the site, which
in turn may lead to an increase, not decrease, in future revenue. Once a regret for overshooting the
advertiser’s budget is not a concern any more, a much more natural objective is to maximize the
network’s total revenue. (A precise definition of the model is given in Section 2.)
Our main result — in Section 3 — is a general treatment of optimization in this model, sub-
suming both versions of budgets. We consider very general influence models (potentially different
for each advertiser), and only require that the local influence function at every node v for every
individual advertiser j is monotone submodular4. Under these assumptions, we show that the
network’s revenue can be approximated to within constant factors. More specifically, when there
are no constraints on individual advertisers’ seed set sizes (only budget constraints limiting the
total number of exposures the advertiser is willing to pay for), then there is a polynomial-time
(1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm, and a simple greedy algorithm achieves a 12 -approximation.
When in addition, there are constraints on the seed set sizes of individual advertisers, we obtain a
1
2+ approximation, for every  > 0.
We show these results by expressing the optimization problem as a monotone submodular maxi-
mization problem over suitably chosen matroid domains, much in the style of Vondrák et al.’s result
on welfare-maximizing partitions [6, 33]. When there are no constraints on individual seed set sizes,
this allows us to bring to bear on the problem Vondrák’s polynomial-time (1− 1/e)-approximation
algorithm for maximizing a submodular function subject to a matroid constraint [6, 33] (see also
subsequent work [7, 28, 34]), and the much simpler 12 -approximation algorithm due to Fischer et
al. [14] (see also [24]). When there are additional constraints on individual seed set sizes, the feasible
ad campaigns can be expressed as the intersection of two matroids, and the algorithm of Lee et
al. [23] gives a 12+ approximation.
While we do not develop new algorithms or heuristics in this part of our work, we consider
it an important contribution to explicitly reduce from advertiser competition constraints to the
intersections of matroids. Such a characterization was missing from prior work, resulting in heuristics
with weaker guarantees and rederiving known arguments. Our work provides a clean optimization
framework that allows the incorporation of different constraints in the future, and the application
of known powerful optimization techniques and guarantees.
While Vondrák’s beautiful (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for maximizing a submodular
function under a matroid constraint [33] runs in polynomial time, it is not practical.5 With this
concern in mind, in Section 4, we develop a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm which scales to
moderately sized networks comprising several tens of thousands of nodes, that are often encountered
in area-aware advertising [2, 1]. Another natural domain with small networks is targeted health and
social intervention programs [36], where network sizes are often only in the hundreds or thousands;
it is very plausible that a principal may want to coordinate multiple interventions, such as safe
4Recall that a set function f is submodular iff f(S ∪ {x})− f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ {x})− f(T ) whenever S ⊆ T .
5The running time is roughly O(n8), with large constants. To the best of our knowledge, the full algorithm has
never been implemented, but we would be surprised if it scaled to more than 10 nodes.
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drug usage, safe sex practices, and others. Unlike our main results, this algorithm is not fully
general, providing guarantees only for the Independent Cascade (IC) Model, and satisfying the
budget constraint only in expectation, rather than for each solution.
The reason that the algorithm only works for the IC model is that it is based on randomly
sampling Reverse Reachable (RR) sets [4, 30, 31]. These RR sets are then used to define and solve
a generalized Maximum Coverage LP, which is then rounded using techniques of Gandhi et al. [15].
An additional important benefit of the algorithm is that the fractional LP which it rounds provides
an upper bound on the performance of the optimum solution. This upper bound is useful in our
experimental evaluation, not only of the LP rounding algorithm, but of other algorithms as well.
In Section 5, we describe experiments to evaluate the effects of competition and tie strengths on
coordinated advertising campaigns. A comparison of algorithms shows that while the greedy algo-
rithm has a worse worst-case approximation guarantee than LP rounding, it performs (marginally)
better in experiments; both algorithms beat several natural heuristics, and get within 85% of the
LP-based upper bound on the optimum; this is significantly better than their worst-case guarantees.
We also develop a parallel version of the Greedy algorithm that accelerates overall processing by
a factor of 12 on a 36-core machine. This allows us to scale to graphs with millions of nodes and
dozens of advertisers.
Since approximation algorithms for “standard” Influence Maximization have been extensively
studied in the literature, our main interest in the experimental evaluation is the effect of competition
between products, and the interaction between competition and tie strengths in the network. Our
experiments show that the more similar the advertisers’ influence networks, the more the host’s
payoff decreases compared to the sum of what could be extracted from the advertisers in isolation.
This effect is exacerbated when the network has a small number of highly influential nodes, since
each advertiser will only be able to target few of these nodes. When nodes’ influence is more even
across the network, the host loses less revenue, because there are enough different “parts” of the
network to extract revenue from all advertisers. When ties are very weak or very strong, the effect
of competition is again attenuated, while for intermediate tie strengths, competition can lead to a
significant revenue loss compared to treating each advertiser separately.
2 Problem Statement
There are m advertisers j = 1, . . . ,m aiming to advertise on a network of n nodes/individuals
V = {1, . . . , n}. We will use u and v (and their variants) to denote nodes, and j (and variants)
exclusively for advertisers.
Product information (or ads or influence) propagates through the social network according to
the general threshold model [21, 27], defined as follows: For each node v and advertiser j, there
is a monotone and submodular local influence function f (j)v : V → [0, 1] with f (j)v (∅) = 0. Each
node v independently chooses thresholds θ(j)v ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random for each product j. Let
A
(j)
t be the set of nodes that have shared ad j by round t. (We call such nodes active for ad j.)
Node v becomes active for ad j in round t+ 1 iff f (j)v (A
(j)
t ) ≥ θ(j)v . The (random) process is seeded
with seed sets A(j)0 (subject to constraints discussed below). It quiesces when no new activations
occur in a single round. At that point, for each ad j, a final (random) set Aˆ(j) has become active.
The general threshold model subsumes most standard models of influence spread, including the
Independent Cascade and Linear Threshold models. Notice that (1) the diffusions for different
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j proceed independently, except for joint constraints on the seed sets (discussed below), and (2)
different ads can in principle follow different diffusion models.
Each advertiser j has a non-negative and monotone value function w(j) giving the payment that
j will make to the network site as a function of the active nodes in the end. In full generality, this
function could depend on the (random) set Aˆ(j) of nodes that are active for j in the end; in this
case, we will assume that w(j) is also submodular. In most cases, however, all nodes in the network
will have the same value to advertiser j, in which case w(j) will only depend on the cardinality
|Aˆ(j)|. In this case, we will assume that w(j) is (weakly) concave; notice that this is a special case
of the previous one, because viewed as a function of Aˆ(j) (rather than |Aˆ(j)|), the function w(j) is
submodular. For notational convenience, and in keeping with much of the prior literature, we write
σ(j)(A
(j)
0 ) = |Aˆ(j)| for the (random) number of nodes that are active in the end when the process
starts with the node set A(j)0 .
A particularly natural case — closest to the definition of Aslay et al. [3] — is when w(j)(x) =
min(B(j), γ(j) · x). Here, B(j) is the advertiser’s budget, while γ(j) is the amount he is willing to
pay per exposure.
The network’s goal is to choose seed sets A(j)0 for all advertisers j, subject to additional con-
straints discussed below, so as to maximize one of the following two global revenue functions:
W (A
(1)
0 , A
(2)
0 , . . . , A
(m)
0 ) =
m∑
j=1
E
[
w(j)(σ(j)(A
(j)
0 ))
]
, (1)
W¯ (A
(1)
0 , A
(2)
0 , . . . , A
(m)
0 ) =
m∑
j=1
w(j)(E
[
σ(j)(A
(j)
0 )
]
). (2)
Notice the subtle difference between the two definitions: W captures the expected revenue from
advertisers who are charged for each campaign individually, according to their functions w(j). The
objective W extends straightforwardly to the case where w(j) depends not only on the cardinality
of Aˆ(j), but on the specific set. In contrast, W¯ corresponds to the case in which advertisers are
charged according to the expected exposure. An essentially equivalent way of expressing the same
objective (up to random noise) is that the revenue is based on the average exposure for advertiser
j over a large number of campaigns.
Specifically in the context of the linear revenue function with a cap of the budget B(j), this
means that under W , advertiser j is never charged more than B(j) for any individual campaign,
while under W¯ , advertiser j’s budget is not exceeded on average over multiple campaigns.
The main constraint, common to both the models of Aslay et al. and Datta et al., is that each
node can be exposed to only a limited number of sponsored ads. We interpret this as saying that
for node v, there is an upper bound rv on the number of seed sets it can be contained in, i.e.,
|{j | v ∈ A(j)0 }| ≤ rv.6
In addition to the node exposure constraints rv, following the model of Datta et al., we also
allow for constraints on the seed set sizes of each advertiser: for each advertiser j, the number of
seed nodes |A(j)0 | cannot exceed K(j). In addition, we can constrain the total number of sponsored
ads (more tightly):
∑
j |A(j)0 | ≤ K. In summary, our target optimization problem is the following:
6This model in fact subsumes one in which each sponsored ad exposure only activates v with some probability
p
(j)
v : add a new ad node v′ with activation function f (j)v′ ≡ 0, and set fˆ (j)v (S ∪ {v′}) = 1 − (1 − p(j)v )(1 − f (j)v (S)).
Then set rv = 0, so only the new “ad nodes” can be targeted.
5
Definition 1 (Multi-Product Influence Maximization) For each advertiser j, choose a seed
set A(j)0 with |A(j)0 | ≤ K(j), such that |{j | v ∈ A(j)0 }| ≤ rv.
Subject to these constraints, maximize W (A(1)0 , A
(2)
0 , . . . , A
(m)
0 ) or W¯ (A
(1)
0 , A
(2)
0 , . . . , A
(m)
0 ).
The Multi-Product Influence Maximization problem is clearly NP-hard, as it subsumes the
standard influence maximization problem.
3 A General Result
We begin with a very general treatment. Under the assumptions we make (the w(j) are submodular
functions of Aˆ(j), or concave functions of |Aˆ(j)|), the overall objective functions W and W¯ are both
submodular. In the case of W , this is because a non-negative linear combination of submodular
functions (in particular: a convex combination of submodular functions) is submodular. In the case
of W¯ , the reason is that |Aˆ(j)| is a monotone submodular function of Aˆ(j), and applying a monotone
concave function preserves submodularity. In both cases, we can therefore apply the result of Mossel
and Roch [27], which guarantees submodularity of the objective for each advertiser, as a function
of the seed set.
To deal with the constraints on node exposures and seed set sizes, we use a technique discussed in
[6, 33] in the context of finding welfare-maximizing assignments of items to individuals. We create a
disjoint union of separate networks (each with the original n nodes) for each advertiser j = 1, . . . ,m,
and then consider joint constraints on seed sets that can be selected across all of the separate
networks. The overall new network Gˆ has nm nodes, one node uv,j for each combination of an original
node v and advertiser j. Let U (j) = {uv,j | v ∈ V } denote the set of new nodes for advertiser j, Xv :=
{uv,j | j = 1, . . . ,m} the set of new nodes corresponding to the node v, an and U =
⋃
j U
(j) =
⋃
vXv.
The influence function for node uv,j is fuv,j (S) := f
(j)
v ({v′ | uv′,j ∈ S}), and thus only depends on the
nodes in the network for advertiser j. Writing Aˆ ⊆ U for the (random) final set of active nodes in Gˆ,
the objective function is W (A0) =
∑
j w
(j)(|{v | uv,j ∈ Aˆ}|), which is submodular by construction.
Targeting the node uv,j in Gˆ corresponds to exposing node v to ad j in the original problem. In
this way, the problem is simply to choose a subset S ⊆ U . The correspondence between seed sets
of Gˆ and ad seeding choices in the original problem is that A(j)0 = {v | uv,j ∈ A0}. The constraints
on the selection of A0 are then that |{j | uv,j ∈ A0}| ≤ rv, |A(j)0 | ≤ K(j) (as well as |A0| ≤ K).
Because the sets U (j) form a disjoint partition of U , the restriction that at most K(j) nodes from
U (j) may be selected defines a partition matroid.7 Similarly, because the sets Xv form a partition,
the constraint that at most rv nodes from Xv may be selected defines a different partition matroid.
The constraint on the total number of selected nodes can be added to either of these partition
matroids, and turns it into a truncated partition matroid. Thus, a consequence of this reduction to
the optimization problem on Gˆ is that the constraints on A0 form the intersection of two matroids:
a partition matroid on the sets U (j), and a truncated partition matroid defined by the sets Xv
and the overall constraint of K on the seed set size. The optimization goal is to select a set A0,
subject to these two matroid constraints, so as to maximize a non-negative, monotone, submodular
function. The latter is a well-studied problem. The key results for our purposes are the following:
7Readers unfamiliar with the standard definitions of matroids and (truncated) partition matroids are directed to
Appendix A.1 or [29].
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Theorem 2 (Theorem 3.1 of [23]) There is a simple local search algorithm for maximizing a
non-negative non-decreasing submodular function subject to k ≥ 2 matroid constraints. For any  >
0, the algorithm (with suitable termination condition) provides a polynomial-time 1k+ -approximation.
Theorem 3 ([14]) The greedy algorithm, which always adds the next element maximizing the in-
crease in the objective function (subject to not violating the matroid constraint), is a 1k+1 approx-
imation algorithm for maximizing a non-negative non-decreasing submodular function subject to k
matroid constraints.
Datta et al. prove an approximation guarantee of 1/3 for a greedy hill climbing algorithm; as
discussed above, they do not consider budget constraints on the total number of exposures. Fur-
thermore, they consider only the special case when all advertisers have the same influence functions
at all nodes. Their proof shows that the constraints form a p-system for p = 2 (a generalization
of the intersection of two matroids); they then invoke an analysis of Calinescu et al. [6] for such
systems. The same result can be obtained by appealing to Theorem 3 instead. By making the
connection to the intersection of matroids explicit8 and invoking Theorem 2 instead, we improve
the approximation guarantee for this problem to essentially 12 , under a much more general problem
setting.9
The model of Aslay et al. does not impose constraints on the seed set sizes of individual ad-
vertisers, and the node exposure constraints and the overall seed set size constraint form a single
truncated partition matroid (as opposed to the intersection of two matroids). If we do not consider
the penalty of overshooting advertisers’ budgets, the resulting payoff function is non-decreasing
submodular; therefore, the approximation guarantee can be improved to (1− 1/e) by appealing to
the following theorem of Vondrák et al.
Theorem 4 ([6, 33]) The continuous-greedy algorithm of [6, 33] is a polynomial-time (1−1/e−)-
approximation for maximizing a non-negative monotone submodular function subject to any matroid
constraint, for arbitrarily small  > 0.
While the continuous-greedy algorithm runs in polynomial time, it is not practical. Notice,
however, that Theorem 3 with k = 1 implies that the greedy algorithm is a 12 -approximation
for the problem of maximizing the network’s expected revenue from coordinated multi-advertiser
campaigns, subject to budget constraints or more general concave advertiser value functions.
The main message of this section is that, when focusing on the arguably more natural objective
of maximizing the network’s revenue (rather than minimizing regret), non-trivial (and in some cases
well-established) algorithmic techniques can be leveraged to obtain algorithms with approximation
guarantees essentially matching those of standard influence maximization. These guarantees apply
in a wide variety of influence models (allowing for completely different influence functions for dif-
ferent advertisers), and under a variety of constraints about the seed sets for different advertisers.
In fact, by leveraging subsequent work on submodular maximization under multiple Knapsack and
matroid constraints (see, e.g., [7, 28, 23, 34]), one can also obtain (somewhat weaker) approximation
guarantees when different seed nodes have different costs (in terms of money or effort) for targeting.
8Datta et al. also discuss matroids, though mostly to remark that the constraints do not form a matroid, and thus
to motivate an analysis in terms of p-systems.
9It should be noted that the analysis of Datta et al. is not really specific to the model they formulate, and could
easily be extended to the general problem statement from Section 2. Thus, our contribution here is not so much
technical as conceptual, explicitly formulating the general problem statement, and identifying the properties that are
really required to obtain the desired guarantees.
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4 An LP-rounding Algorithm for the Independent Cascade Model
In this section, we focus on the special case of the Independent Cascade (IC) Model for influence in
a network, and a budgeted linear valuation function: the payoff the host receives from advertiser j
is w(j)(Aˆ(j)) = min(B(j), γ(j) · |Aˆ(j)|). The IC Model for influence has been widely studied; a reader
wishing to briefly review the definition may find a description in Appendix A.2. In talking about
the model, we use p(j)e to denote the probability that an edge e = (u, v) activates node v for product
j when node u has become active for product j.
We use the idea of Reverse Reachability sets [4, 30, 31] to reduce the multi-advertiser campaign
coordination problem to a generalized Maximum Coverage problem; we then show how to round the
LP, using an algorithm of Gandhi et al. [15], to obtain a polynomial-time and reasonably practical
(1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the problem with both node and advertiser constraints.
This approximation guarantee gives an improvement over the 12 -approximation guarantee of
the local search algorithm (Theorem 2). When the seed set sizes of individual advertisers are
not restricted, the continuous greedy algorithm of Theorem 4 matches the LP rounding algorithm’s
(1−1/e) guarantee, but the continuous greedy algorithm is completely impractical. The LP rounding
algorithm is less efficient than the simple greedy algorithm from Theorem 3, but provides better
approximation guarantees.
The downside, compared to the more general treatment in Section 3, is that the results only
hold for the IC Model, and the budget constraints on the number of exposures will only be satisfied
in expectation: in any one run, the algorithm may charge an advertiser j (significantly) more than
B(j).
4.1 The Reverse Reachability Technique
A very useful alternative view of the Independent Cascade Model was first shown in [21], and heavily
used in subsequent work: generate graphs G(j) by including each edge e in G(j) independently with
probability p(j)e . Then, the distribution of nodes activated by ad j in the end, when starting from
the set A(j)0 , is the same as the distribution of nodes reachable from A
(j)
0 in the random graph G
(j).
This alternative view forms the basis of the Reverse Reachability Set Technique, first proposed
and analyzed by Borgs, Brautbar, Chayes, and Lucier [4], and further refined by Tang, Xiao, and
Shi [30, 31]. The primary goal of [4, 30, 31] was to permit a more efficient evaluation of the
objective σ(A0). Under both the Independent Cascade and Linear Threshold Models, evaluating
σ(A0) is known to be #P-complete [10, 35]. Reverse Reachability sets permit a more efficient (both
theoretically and practically) approximate evaluation, as compared to the obvious Monte Carlo
simulation.
We explain the Reverse Reachability technique for a single ad, and omit the index j for readabil-
ity for now. The key insight is the following: let v be an arbitrary node, and consider the (random)
set R of all nodes that can reach v in the randomly generated graph G. Then, the probability that
v is activated starting from A0 is equal to the probability that A0 ∩R 6= ∅. (See, e.g., [31, Lemma
2].)
More generally, if we draw ρ such sets R1, . . . , Rρ independently, and for independently uniformly
random target nodes v, and A0 intersects α(A0) of them, then
n·α(A0)
ρ is an unbiased estimator of
the expected number of nodes activated when starting from A0. In order to leverage this insight for
computational savings in computing ad campaigns, it is important that the estimate be sufficiently
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accurate with sufficiently high probability, for a small enough number ρ of reverse reachable sets. A
characterization of this accuracy is given by the following lemma from [31] (restated slightly here):
Lemma 5 (Lemma 3 of [31]) Assume that
ρ ≥ (8 + 2) · n · c log n+ log
(
n
k
)
+ log 2
OPT · 2 . (3)
Consider any set S of at most k nodes. With probability at least 1−n−c/(nk), the following inequality
holds for S: ∣∣∣∣n · α(S)ρ − σ(S)
∣∣∣∣ < 2 ·OPT. (4)
Here OPT is the maximum influence spread that can be achieved by any set S of at most k nodes.
Lemma 5 implies that when ρ is large enough to allow taking a union bound over all relevant
sets S, the fraction of sets Ri that intersect a candidate seed set S is an accurate stand-in for the
actual objective function σ(S). As already observed by Borgs et al. [4], this reduces the problem of
influence maximization to a Maximum Coverage problem: selecting a set of at most k seed nodes
that jointly maximize the number of sets Ri containing at least one seed node.
Without loss of generality, assume that K(j) ≤ K for all j. Let OPT(j) be the maximum
influence that advertiser j could achieve with K(j) seed nodes, and ignoring the budget constraint
B(j). A lower bound ˆOPT
(j)
on each OPT(j) can be found by running the TIM algorithm [31]
with seed sets of size K(j). For each advertiser j, we draw ρ(j) ≥ 9n3m2 · c logn+logm+log (
n
K(j))+log 2
ˆOPT
(j)·2
nodes10 v i.i.d. uniformly (in particular, with replacement) from U (j), and for each such v, we let
R ⊆ U (j) be the random reverse reachable set. For later ease of notation, we index the nodes as
vi ∈ U , and the corresponding sets as Ri. Notice that the same node v might appear as vi for
different i, with possibly different sets Ri. For each such index i of a node vi and set Ri, let j(i) be
the unique advertiser j such that Ri ⊆ U (j), and write R(j) = {i | j(i) = j} for the set of all sets
used to estimate the influences for advertiser j.
Focus on any advertiser j, and the influence of any set S ⊆ U (j) with |S| ≤ K(j). Using Lemma 5
with ′ = nm ≤ 12 and c′ = c+ logn(m), the influence of S is estimated to within an additive term

nm ·OPT(j) with probability at least 1−n−c
′
/
(
n
K(j)
)
= 1−1/(ncm)·1/( nK(j)). By a union bound over
all such sets S (of which there are11
(
n
K(j)
)
) and all m advertisers j = 1, . . . ,m, the influence of all
such sets S is simultaneously estimated to within an additive term of nm ·OPT(j), with probability
at least 1− 1/nc. Assume for the rest of this section that the high-probability event has happened.
Now consider an arbitrary seed set S with |S| ≤ K, not necessarily contained in just one partition
U (j). Let S(j) = S ∩ U (j), and let q(j) = n·|{i∈R(j)|Ri∩S(j) 6=∅}|ρ be the estimated expected influence
of S(j). By the preceding paragraph, the influence of each S(j) is estimated to within an additive

nm ·OPT(j), i.e., |q(j) − σ(S(j))| ≤ nm ·OPT(j). We next want to show that for each j, the actual
10This value of ρ(j) is chosen with foresight to apply Lemma 5 and allow the application of various bounds in the
following paragraphs.
11When running a greedy algorithm, only O(mnK) such sets need to be considered, which leads to significant
computational savings. Here, our goal is to leverage the reverse reachability technique not necessarily for significant
computational savings, but for improved approximation guarantees.
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payoff the host obtains from advertiser j, i.e., min(B(j), γ(j) · σ(S(j))) is estimated to within an
additive term /m · OPT; then, by summing over all m advertisers j, the total estimation error is
at most  ·OPT.
To prove the estimation error bound for an advertiser j, we consider several cases. First, if
S(j) = ∅, then the payoff 0 is estimated completely accurately. Second, if B(j) ≤ γ(j), i.e., the
advertiser’s budget is so low that he pays for at most one impression, the payoff is also estimated
completely accurately. The reason is that for any S(j) 6= ∅, all nodes in S(j) will always be shown
impressions, so γ(j) · q(j) ≥ B(j) with probability 1. As a result, the payoff from the advertiser is
estimated correctly as B(j). Finally, if B(j) ≥ γ(j), then OPT(j) ≤ n · OPT/γ(j). The reason is
that the optimum does at least as well as using K(j) seed nodes for advertiser j, which would yield
payoff OPT ≥ min(B(j), γ(j) ·OPT(j)) ≥ γ(j) ·min(1,OPT(j)) ≥ γ(j)OPT(j)/n, because OPT(j) ≤ n.
Thus, the estimation error for the payoff from advertiser j is at most γ(j) · nm ·OPT(j) ≤ m ·OPT.12
4.2 The LP and Rounding Algorithm
Notice that except for the budget caps B(j), the objective is a sum of (scaled) coverage functions.
This suggests the natural formulation of an LP, which allows us to use a randomized rounding
technique due to Gandhi et al. [15].
Recall that each set Ri is generated by a reverse (random) BFS from a randomly sampled node
v ∈ U , where the same node v may be sampled for multiple i. Also recall that j(i) is the unique
advertiser for the reverse reachable set Ri, and that R(j) is the set of all reverse reachability sets
Ri with j(i) = j. We use the decision variable z
(j)
v to denote whether node v was targeted for
ad j, xi for the decision variable whether at least one node from the set Ri was selected (for its
corresponding ad), and the variable y(j) for the total revenue from advertiser j. The optimization
objective can be expressed using the following Integer Linear Program (ILP):
Maximize
∑
j y
(j)
subject to xi ≤
∑
v∈Ri z
(j(i))
v for all i
xi ≤ 1 for all i∑
j z
(j)
v ≤ rv for all v∑
v z
(j)
v ≤ K(j) for all j∑
j,v z
(j)
v ≤ K
y(j) ≤ nρ ·
∑
i∈R(j) γ
(j)xi for all j
y(j) ≤ B(j) for all j
xi, y
(j), z
(j)
v ≥ 0 for all i, j, v
z
(j)
v ∈ {0, 1} for all j, v.
(5)
The first constraint states that a target node vi is only covered if at least one node from the
set Ri is selected, and the second constraint ensures that the LP derives no benefit from double-
covering nodes. The third constraint encodes the bound on the number of targeted ads that v can
be exposed to, while the fourth constraint encodes the bound on the seed set sizes of the advertisers
12Some of the complications in the proof arose because of the possibility of very different budgets and payoffs
per node across advertisers. When the payoff per node for all advertisers is equal, i.e., γ(j) = γˆ for all j, then
ρ(j) ≥ (8+2)n2m2γˆ2 · c logn+log (
n
K)+logK+log 2
2OPT2
RR set samples are enough to provide accurate payoff estimates with
sufficiently high probability.
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j. The fifth constraint captures the overall bound on the total number of targeted ads. The sixth
and seventh constraints characterize the objective function for advertiser j.
Of course, solving the ILP is NP-hard, so as usual, we consider the fractional LP relaxation
obtained by omitting the final integrality constraint z(j)v ∈ {0, 1}. Without this constraint, the LP
can be solved in polynomial time, obtaining a fractional solution (x,y, z).
To round the fractional solution, we use the dependent rounding algorithm of Gandhi et al.
(See Section 2 of [15].) This algorithm can be applied to round fractional solutions whenever
the variables to be rounded (here: the z(j)v ) can be considered as edges in a bipartite graph, and
constraints correspond to bounds on the (fractional) degrees of the nodes of the bipartite graph.13
It repeatedly rounds the fractional values associated with a subset of edges forming a maximal path
or a cycle, until all variables are integral; let zˆ(j)v denote the rounded (integral) values corresponding
to z(j)v . The algorithm of [15] provides the following guarantees:
• The probability that the variable z(j)v is rounded to zˆ(j)v = 1 is exactly z(j)v , for all j and v.
• In the bipartite graph, each node’s degree is rounded up or down to an adjacent integer. In
the context of our LP (5), this means that the number of seed nodes for each advertiser is
either rounded up or down to the nearest integer, as is the number of exposures to sponsored
ads for each node. In particular, the third and fourth constraints are satisfied with probability
1.
• For any node of the bipartite graph and any subset of incident edges, the rounded values
are negatively correlated. In the context of our LP (5), for any advertiser j = j(i) and
reverse reachable set Ri, the algorithm guarantees that Prob[zˆ
(j)
v = 0 for all v ∈ Ri] ≤∏
v∈Ri Prob[zˆ
(j)
v = 0] =
∏
v∈Ri(1− z
(j)
v ).
After rounding all the z(j)v to zˆ
(j)
v , for each i, we set xˆi = 1 if at least one v ∈ Ri has zˆ(j(i))v = 1,
and for each j, we set yˆ(j) =
∑
i∈R(j) γ
(j) · xˆi. Together with the guarantees of Gandhi et al., this
ensures that all ILP constraints except possibly the seventh (budget) constraint are satisfied; the
budget constraint is discussed more in Section 4.4.
Theorem 6 Under the IC model, with constraints on node exposures and advertiser seed set sizes,
the (modified) Gandhi et al. correlated LP-rounding based algorithm is a polynomial-time (1− 1/e)-
approximation algorithm, if advertisers pay based on their expected exposure.
Proof. Consider any set Ri ∈ R(j). With explanations of some steps given below, the probability
13The fifth constraint of our LP (overall budget) does not fit in this framework, since it is a constraint on all
variables. We extend the rounding algorithm of Gandhi et al. by one more final loop (see below) which repeatedly
picks any two fractional variables and randomly rounds them using the same approach as the rest of the algorithm,
until only one fractional variable remains. This last variable can then be rounded randomly by itself.
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that xˆi = 1 is
Prob[xˆi = 1] = 1− Prob[zˆ(j(i))v = 0 for all v ∈ Ri]
(1)
≥ 1−
∏
v∈Ri
Prob[zˆ(j(i))v = 0]
= 1−
∏
v∈Ri
(1− z(j(i))v )
(2)
≥ 1− e−
∑
v∈Ri z
(j(i))
v
≥ 1− e−min(1,
∑
v∈Ri z
(j(i))
v )
(3)
≥ (1− 1/e) ·min(1,
∑
v∈Ri
z(j(i))v )
(4)
≥ (1− 1/e) · xi.
The inequality labeled (1) used the negative dependence discussed above. The inequality labeled
(2) used the standard bound that 1−x ≤ e−x for all x ≥ 0. The inequality labeled (3) uses that the
function x 7→ 1 − e−x is concave, and hence on the interval [0, 1] is lower-bounded by the straight
line which agrees with it at the endpoints x = 0 and x = 1, which is the function x 7→ (1− 1/e) · x.
Finally, the inequality labeled (4) uses that xi ≤ min(1,
∑
v∈Ri z
(j(i))
v ) by the first and second LP
constraints. Using the definition of yˆ(j), we now get that
E
[
yˆ(j)
]
= E
 ∑
i∈R(j)
γ(j) · xˆi
 = ∑
i∈R(j)
γ(j) · Prob[xˆi = 1]
≥
∑
i∈R(j)
γ(j) · (1− 1/e) · xi ≥ (1− 1/e) · y(j).
4.3 No Seed Set Size Restrictions
In the model of Aslay et al., and in our experiments in Section 5, there are no restrictions placed
on the seed set sizes of individual advertisers; that is, the fourth set of constraints in the LP (5)
is missing. In the absence of these constraints, the correlated LP-rounding algorithm of Gandhi et
al. [15] can be further sped up. Note that except for the fifth (sum of seed set sizes) constraint,
the z(j)v constraints are a collection of disjoint stars. As a result, the general correlated rounding
algorithm of Gandhi et al. can be replaced with their algorithm for stars. The resulting algorithm
runs in linear time and is very simple to implement. It first uses the correlated rounding on pairs
of variables z(j)v , z
(j′)
v corresponding to the same node (and different advertisers) until no such pairs
remain; subsequently, as for the general algorithm, we add one more while loop to round pairs of
the remaining z(j)v (which now necessarily correspond to distinct nodes v, v′).
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Because there is at most one fractional variable remaining incident on any node j or v, the
second property of the Gandhi et al. rounding algorithm is preserved. The negative correlation
property holds inductively, because at most two values are rounded in each step.
4.4 The Budget Constraints
In Theorem 6, we emphasized that advertiser payments have to be based on the expected exposure,
rather than the actual exposure. Indeed, using the LP rounding approach, maintaining the budget
constraints in each run is not possible without a huge (Ω(m)) loss in the approximation guarantee.
The reason is that LP (5) has an integrality gap of Ω(m) when the budgets are constrained. Consider
the following input: the influence graph is a star with n leaves, in which the center node has
probability 1 of influencing all its neighbors, and no one else can influence any other node. Thus,
any advertiser who gets to advertise to the center node will reach the entire graph.
Suppose that each advertiser j has a budget of B(j) = n/m, and the center node v has a
constraint of rv = 1. A fractional solution can allocate a fraction of 1/m of the center node to each
advertiser; each advertiser then reaches n/m nodes, not exceeding his budget, and the host obtains
a payoff of n. But any integral solution can only allocate v to one advertiser, who will then pay at
most his budget n/m. Thus, any integral solution obtains payoff at most n/m.
This problem disappears if each advertiser’s budget must only be met in expectation. In other
words, on any given day, the advertiser’s budget could be exceeded, even by a lot. But on average, the
advertiser does not pay more for impressions than B(j) per day. Because the number of impressions
resulting from a particular rounding choice is a random variable in [0, n], standard tail bounds
(e.g., Hoeffding Bounds) show that the total payment is with high probability close to the expected
payment after about O(n) days.
5 Experiments
In this section, we describe an empirical evaluation of the relationship between the total revenue to
the host and the algorithm used, the number of advertisers, and the total number of sponsored ads.
More importantly, we also consider the interplay of competition with the influence strengths in the
network and the similarity/dissimilarity of the advertisers’ influence networks. We conducted our
experiments on a 36-core Linux server with an Intel Xeon E5-2695 v4 processor at 2.1GHz and 1TB
memory. We develop a parallel version of the Greedy algorithm that scales to networks of millions
of nodes and tens of millions of edges, with dozens of advertisers (see Section 5.5).
All of our experiments are based on the Independent Cascade (IC) Model. We employed the
Reverse Reachability technique to (approximately) compute the influence of node sets more effi-
ciently. In Section 4, we obtained an upper bound on the number of RR sets ρ(j) to guarantee
good approximations with high probability. This bound is quite large, and using the corresponding
number of sets would not permit us to scale experiments to large networks. We conducted extensive
experiments on the number of RR sets that are sufficient to guarantee high accuracy in practice.
These experiments are described in detail in Appendix B; the upshot is that ρ(j) ≥ 10n RR sets are
sufficient to guarantee an estimation error  ≤ 2%. Therefore, for the experiments reported in the
remainder of this section, we used a value of ρ(j) = 10n.
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5.1 Data Sets and Generation of IC Instances
We used the following four real-world networks, whose key statistics are summarized in Table 1.
(Two larger networks used for scalability experiments are described in Section 5.5.)
• Facebook [22] is an ego network of a user in Facebook, excluding the ego node.
• Advogato [22] is a social network whose nodes are users of the Advogato platform; directed
edges (u, v) are trust links.
• DBLP [22] is a citation network in which nodes are papers, and there is a directed edge from
u to v if u cites v.
• NetHEPT [9] is a collaboration network generated from co-authorships in high-energy physics
publications.
Table 1: Data Set characteristics
Dataset #nodes #edges Type
Facebook 2,889 2,981 Undirected
Advogato 6,542 51,127 Directed
DBLP 12,592 49,743 Directed
NetHEPT 15,229 31,376 Undirected
In creating influence networks (with edge probabilities p(j)u,v), for most of our experiments, we
wanted to avoid the assumption of uniform probabilities on edges commonly made when evaluating
algorithms for influence maximization. The reason is that one key aspect of our work is the notion of
coordination/competition between different advertisers. When all edges have uniform probabilities
p
(j)
u,v, the value of a node is solely determined by its network position. We therefore define a way of
generating edge probabilities non-uniformly that gives some nodes intrinsically more importance.
For each node v, we draw a parameter λv independently and uniformly from [0, 0.4] for Facebook ,
DBLP and NetHEPT , and [0, 0.3] for Advogato. (The different intervals were chosen to counteract
the effects of varying edge densities in the datasets.) We then define pu,v = λu · λv. We will discuss
below how the p(j)u,v are correlated for different j.
For all experiments, we set the constraint on the number of sponsored ads that can be shown to
node v to rv = 1, i.e., each node can be shown a sponsored ad from at most one advertiser. This
results in maximal inter-advertiser constraints for the seed sets. We also performed experiments
varying the value of rv. The outcome of these experiments is that what matters is mostly the ratio
rv/m. As rv grows (with m fixed), the optimization problem gradually decouples across advertisers.
As a result, the most interesting and novel aspects of the model manifest themselves when rv = 1.
For simplicity, we set each advertiser’s payoff per exposure to γ(j) = 1. The overall numbers of
sponsored ads K are varied for different experiments, and discussed below. In our experiments, we
did not consider individual advertiser seed set constraints K(j); such constraints are heavily studied
in traditional Influence Maximization experiments, and we wanted to focus on the novel aspects
arising due to advertiser competition.
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5.2 Comparison between the Algorithms
Our first set of experiments simply compared the performance of our algorithms and several baseline
heuristics. We implemented the following algorithms:
• Greedy is the standard greedy algorithm for maximizing a submodular function subject to a
matroid constraint (Theorem 3).
• LP-Rounding is described in Section 4.2.
• Max-Degree considers nodes by non-increasing degrees, and assigns them to advertisers in a
round-robin order. Each node v is assigned to rv consecutive advertisers.
• Eigen-Centrality considers nodes by non-increasing eigenvector centrality14, and assigns them to
advertisers in a round-robin order, as with Max-Degree .
• OPTLP is the value of the optimal fractional solution of the LP (5). It provides an upper bound
on the value of the optimal solution, and thus gives us a benchmark to compare the algorithms’
performance to, on an absolute scale.
5.2.1 Varying the total number of seeds
In the first set of experiments, we kept the number of advertisers constant at m = 3, and varied
the total number K of seed nodes. Thus, these experiments are similar to evaluations of standard
Influence Maximization algorithms. To avoid strong effects of competition between advertisers
(which we are evaluating in later sections), we generated the λ(j)v (and hence the p
(j)
u,v) independently
for each j.
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Figure 1: Host payoff vs. number of sponsored ads (K)
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the total host payoff achieved by the algorithms as K is varied
from 10 to 100. Both LP-Rounding and Greedy perform significantly better than Max-Degree or
Eigen-Centrality . This is not surprising, as the heuristics only consider the network structure, but
not the influence probabilities associated with edges. However, the random generation of edge
probabilities still ensures that nodes of high degree or high centrality tend to be more influential;
hence, in some scenarios (especially with small K), the payoffs of the Max-Degree and Eigen-
Centrality heuristics are comparable to those of Greedy and LP-Rounding .
14The eigenvector entries of the leading eigenvector of the graph’s adjacency matrix.
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Figure 2: Average per-advertiser payoff vs. number of advertisers (m)
A comparison to the fractional LP solution value shows that both Greedy and LP-Rounding
achieve more than 85% of the optimal payoff, which is significantly more than the respective guar-
antees of 12 and 1− 1e . Experimentally, on these instances, Greedy performed marginally better than
LP-Rounding .
5.2.2 Varying the number of advertisers
For the second set of experiments, we varied the number m of advertisers from 1 to 20, scaling the
number of seeds as K = 10m, to keep an average of 10 seeds per advertiser. Again, we did not add
constraints on the budgets or the individual advertisers’ seed sets.
Using this set of experiments, we also studied the effect (on payoff) of competition between
advertisers, as caused by the constraint that each node can only be chosen as a seed for one adver-
tiser.15 Therefore, we made the influence probabilities p(j)u,v the same for all j, i.e., the same nodes
are most influential for all advertisers.
Figure 2 shows the per-advertiser payoff achieved as m is varied from 1 to 20. A comparison of
the algorithms’ performance yields results similar to those reported in Section 5.2.1. For a single
advertiser, the performance of the Max-Degree heuristic is comparable to LP-Rounding and Greedy .
As explained earlier, this observation can be attributed to the random generation of uniform edge
probabilities. For larger values of m, there is a significant difference in the performances of the
Greedy and LP-Rounding algorithms vs. the Max-Degree and Eigen-Centrality heuristics. A likely
explanation is the following: when many advertisers compete on the same network, Greedy and
LP-Rounding can alleviate competition for a limited pool of highly influential nodes by indirectly
influencing such nodes using other carefully chosen seeds. In contrast, Max-Degree and Eigen-
Centrality do not consider such potential propagation for seed selection.
Another observation is that as a result of the competition, per-advertiser payoff decreases and
hence, the total host payoff does not scale linearly inm. For a single advertiser, DBLP and Advogato
have significantly higher payoff than Facebook and NetHEPT . With 20 advertisers, on the DBLP and
Facebook networks, the average payoff per advertiser decreases by factors of 2.8 and 2.4, respectively,
while the decrease for Advogato is a factor of 2. Comparatively, NetHEPT exhibits only modest
competition, and its per-advertiser payoff decreases only by a factor of 1.4. A possible cause for the
15If there were no constraint on the number of sponsored ads per node, there would be no competition, and the
total payoff would increase linearly in m. Note also that the total influence of the seed sets of all advertisers is
different from the influence of their seed sets’ union if assigned to one advertiser: while no two advertisers can choose
the same seed node, if the different seed nodes influence the same nodes later, they will both derive utility (and the
host revenue) from those exposures.
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higher decreases may be the very skewed degree distributions of the DBLP and Facebook networks,
which results in a smaller number of extremely valuable nodes, and the fact that Advogato and
DBLP are directed, resulting in less symmetry between nodes. The strong competition for DBLP
and Facebook can also be observed in the fact that the gradient of the per-advertiser payoff is very
negative for small values of m. For larger m, the decrease becomes less pronounced, because there
are many marginally useful seed nodes to choose from.
5.3 Effects of Competition
Next, we focused in detail on the effects of competition on total host payoff. More specifically, the
question we were interested in is the following: how does the similarity or dissimilarity of influence
networks for different advertisers affect revenue? If the influence networks are very similar, then
high-value seed nodes for one advertiser will typically also be high-value for others, and the constraint
that no node must be chosen by more than a given number of advertisers (in our experiments: 1) will
constrain the reach of seed sets. On the other hand, if the influence networks are very different, then
different advertisers might focus on different parts of the network, and the host could potentially
derive significantly higher payoff.
Since the purpose of these experiments is not to compare the performance of algorithms, but
to draw qualitative insights, we ran these experiments only using the Greedy algorithm, which had
performed best in our earlier experiments.
For these experiments, we fixed the number of advertisers to m = 20 and total seeds to K = 200.
To cover a spectrum of different similarities between networks, we used the following generative
model. All advertisers initially have the same edge probabilities pu,v. We can assume for simplicity
that the graph is complete, by setting pu,v = 0 whenever (u, v) is not an edge. A parameter
s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 200} will capture the similarity between the networks for different advertisers. Each
advertiser j’s influence strengths p(j)u,v are generated independently as follows. Starting from pu,v,
perform s· n100 node swaps of the following form: select two vertices u, v independently and uniformly
at random, and switch all their associated influence probabilities, i.e., set pˆ(j)u,w = p
(j)
v,w and pˆ
(j)
v,w = p
(j)
u,w
for all w 6= u, v, and pˆ(j)u,v = p(j)v,u and pˆ(j)v,u = p(j)u,v.
The effect is that the influence networks for all advertisers j are exactly isomorphic to each
other, i.e., no advertiser has an a priori better network. However, the larger the value of s, the more
independent the networks are, which we expected to lead to more potential to derive payoff from
all advertisers simultaneously.
Figure 3 shows the payoff as a function of s. First, notice that the host’s payoff does indeed
increase steeply in s, nearly linearly for a non-trivial segment. This shows that competition between
advertisers for high-impact nodes indeed restricts the host’s payoff; as the advertisers’ influence
networks become more dissimilar, the host can extract more payoff from the joint ad campaigns.
Next, we observe that the relative increase in payoff (comparing no swaps vs. 2n swaps) is no-
ticeably higher in the Facebook (a factor of 2.4) and DBLP (a factor of 2.7) networks, compared
to the Advogato (a factor of 1.8) and NetHEPT (a factor of 1.3) networks. This aligns with our
earlier observations: the Facebook and DBLP data sets seem to have fewer high-influence nodes, as
compared to the more even influence of nodes in Advogato and NetHEPT . Thus, ensuring more in-
dependence among the isomorphic copies of the Facebook and DBLP graphs creates more potential
for additional payoff.
Further, the payoff saturates around just n/3 swaps for NetHEPT , as opposed to around n
17
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Figure 3: Host payoff vs. influence network similarity.
swaps for Facebook , Advogato and DBLP . This is likely because networks with more competition
require more swaps to completely realize the potential of essentially independent campaigns.
5.4 Effect of Influence Probabilities
For our final set of experiments, we were interested in the interplay between competition and edge
strengths. We expected two counter-acting effects: as the probabilities on edges increase, more
different seed nodes may become capable of reaching the same large part of the network, thus
reducing the negative effects of competition. On the other hand, as the edge probabilities decrease,
most cascades will not spread beyond a few nodes; as a result, all parts of the network may provide
small influence, so again, the additional detrimental effects of competition could be reduced.
For m advertisers, we chose a combined seed set size of K = 10m, and gave each advertiser a
budget of B(j) = n/5. Different from the earlier experiments, we assigned uniform probabilities of p
to the edges, and varied the value of p. Again, because our goal was to study the interplay between
competition and parameters of the model (rather than comparing algorithms), we only used the
Greedy algorithm. We were interested in the host’s payoff increase as the number of advertisers is
increased from 1 to 20. We call the ratio between the two quantities the relative payoff at m = 20,
and denote it by α.
Figure 4 shows the relative payoff α as a function of p. The two counter-acting effects produce
— for all four networks — a local minimum in α. As p grows large, the ratio saturates at 20; this is
not surprising, as with high enough probabilities, essentially any node will reach the entire graph,
and there is in effect no competition, resulting in a 20-fold increase in host payoff.
For Advogato and NetHEPT (the two graphs which earlier showed less susceptibility to compe-
tition), the ratio α is minimized at the same p = 0.02. However, the underlying reasons appear to
be different. Advogato has a high edge density; as a result, advertisements spread to a large portion
of the graph even for small p; in particular, already for p ≥ 0.1, the reach of every ad campaign j
matches the budget B(j). The curve for NetHEPT looks similar, but for different reasons. Here,
the reason appears to be that NetHEPT is sparse and exhibits little competition from the start,
which is confirmed by the fact that α never drops below 15. Here, the advertisers’ budgets B(j)
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are only fully extracted around p = 0.25, but the decentralized nature of the graph ensures lack of
harmful competition much earlier, which is why α saturates around p = 0.1.
For Facebook and DBLP , the two graphs exhibiting more competition, the minimum is attained
at p = 0.04. Notice that the minimum value of α for these data sets is significantly smaller and
the saturation of α = 20 happens later than for the other networks. This behavior again shows the
stronger competition. Specifically for DBLP , even at p = 0.3, the network only extracted about
half of the sum of all advertiser budgets.
5.5 Scalability and Parallelization
We evaluated the scalability of the Greedy algorithm on the following two large datasets:
• Pokec [22] is a friendship network from the Slovakian social network Pokec, containing 1,632,803
individuals (nodes), and 30,622,564 directed edges (directed friendships).
• Flixster [22] is a social network of a movie rating site where people with similar cinematic
taste can connect with each other. It contains 2,523,386 individuals and 7,918,801 (undirected)
edges.
We evaluated scalability by measuring the runtime as a function of the number of advertisers
m. The LP Rounding algorithm does not scale to such large datasets; its limit is a few tens of
thousands of nodes and edges.
In order to utilize all 36 cores on the server, we parallelized the RR set construction in the Greedy
algorithm, which contributes most to the overall execution time. Figure 5 shows that the parallel
algorithm can compute seed sets on the large graphs in scenarios with large numbers of competing
advertisers, even when the sequential algorithm fails to terminate in a reasonable amount of time.
The parallel Greedy algorithm accelerates RR-set construction by a factor about 22 on average, and
is overall about 12 times faster than the sequential version.
Due to the large graph sizes and extremely skewed degree distributions in Pokec and Flixster ,
the highly influential nodes had significantly more impact, and the overall payoff was up to two
orders of magnitude larger than for the Facebook , Advogato, NetHEPT and DBLP networks. This
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Figure 5: Running times of the sequential and parallel Greedy algorithm on the Flixster and Pokec
datasets.
resulted in slower seed set selection, which became a significant factor when the RR-set construction
was parallelized. As a result, we see that the runtime of our parallel implementation (especially in
Pokec) scales sub-linearly with respect to m when there are more than a dozen advertisers.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We explored the problem of maximizing the host’s payoff for a budgeted multi-advertiser setting
with constraints on the ad exposure of each node and each advertiser’s seed set size. We showed that
under a very general class of influence models, this problem can be cast as maximizing a submodular
function subject to two matroid constraints. It can therefore be approximated to within essentially
a factor 12 using an algorithm due to Lee et al. [23]; this improves on the
1
3 -approximation guarantee
of [11]. When there are no constraints on individual advertisers’ seed set sizes, only on the total
number of seeds, the constraints form just a single truncated partition matroid. Therefore, the
algorithm of Vondrák et al. [6, 33] gives (1 − 1e )-approximation algorithm, while a simple greedy
algorithm [14] achieves a 12 -approximation. For the special case of the Independent Cascade model,
the Reverse Reachability Technique [4, 30, 31] can be combined with a linear program and rounding
due to [5, 15] to yield a more efficient (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm, even under both types of
constraints.
Our experiments show that in practice, the greedy algorithm slightly outperforms the LP-
rounding based algorithm, despite its worse approximation guarantee. They also reveal that com-
petition between advertisers leads to a loss in payoff for the host when the advertisers’ influence
networks are more similar, and particularly so when the networks have few highly influential nodes
— in that case, these nodes cannot simultaneously be used as seeds for all advertisers, and the
average exposure per advertiser becomes significantly lower than the individual exposures of the
advertisers on isolated networks.
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Our work was in part motivated by considering a more “natural” objective function than the
notion of regret from [3]. If one believes that giving advertisers free exposure is detrimental to
the host company, excess exposure could alternatively be modeled as a negative term in the objec-
tive function. In additional work not included here, we show that if the penalty per unit excess
exposure is constant, the greedy algorithm and LP rounding algorithm still yield constant-factor
approximation guarantees.
There are several natural directions for future work. Perhaps most directly, the LP-rounding
based algorithm only satisfies the budget constraint in expectation; indeed, we have shown a large
integrality gap for the LP. It is a natural question whether a (1 − 1/e)-approximation guarantee
can be obtained while always satisfying the budget constraints, and without invoking the heavy
Continuous Greedy machinery discussed in Section 3.
An interesting empirical study would be to evaluate to what extent influential nodes in one ad-
vertiser’s network are also influential in other advertisers’ networks. Within typical social networks,
one would expect significant differences based on individuals’ expertise; on the other hand, the use
of celebrities to endorse products entirely outside their realm of expertise shows that humans appear
willing to project expertise in one area on other areas as well.
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A Review of Basic Concepts
In this section, we provide definitions and descriptions of several concepts we believe to be standard,
but which some readers may want to review.
A.1 Matroids and (truncated) Partition Matroids
Definition 7 (Matroid) A matroid is a non-empty, downward-closed16 set system (X, I), with the
following exchange property: if S, S′ ∈ I, and |S| < |S′|, then there exists some element x ∈ S′ \ S
such that S ∪ {x} ∈ I. The sets in I are called independent sets.
Definition 8 (Partition Matroid, Truncation) A partition matroid is defined as follows: Let
X1, X2, . . . , Xp be a disjoint partition of X, and b1, b2, . . . , bp be non-negative integers. A set S is
independent (i.e., in I) iff |S ∩Xi| ≤ bi for all i.
A truncation of a matroid (X, I) is obtained by replacing I with {S ∈ I | |S| ≤ k}, i.e., by
discarding all sets of size exceeding k. It is easy to see that any truncation of a matroid is again a
matroid.
A.2 The Independent Cascade Model
The Independent Cascade (IC) Model [17, 16, 21] is defined as follows. (We give the generalization to
multiple ads directly here.) For each ad j and (directed) edge e = (u, v), there is a known probability
p
(j)
e with which u will succeed in activating v. Starting from a seed set A
(j)
0 , in each round t, each
newly activated (for ad j) node u can make one attempt to activate each currently inactive (for j)
neighbor v. The attempt succeeds with probability p(j)u,v, independently of other activation attempts.
If at least one activation attempt (for j) on v is successful, v will become active for j at time t+ 1,
i.e., become part of A(j)t+1. As proved, e.g., in [21], the Independent Cascade Model is a special case
of the General Threshold Model from Section 2, by setting f (j)v (S) = 1−
∏
u∈S(1− p(j)u,v).
A very useful alternative view of the Independent Cascade Model was first shown in [21], and
heavily used in subsequent work: generate graphsG(j) by including each edge e inG(j) independently
with probability p(j)e . Then, the distribution of nodes activated by ad j in the end, when starting
from the set A(j)0 , is the same as the distribution of nodes reachable from A
(j)
0 in the random graph
G(j).
B Number of Reverse Reachable Sets vs. Estimation Error
An important part of all algorithms for the optimization problem is being able to evaluate the ob-
jective function. Doing so exactly is #P-complete [10, 35]. Good approximations can be obtained
by using Reverse Reachable (RR) sets, as described in Section 4. However, the theoretical bounds
from Section 4 that guarantee a good approximation of the objective, while polynomial, are suffi-
ciently large that algorithms using this many RR sets would not scale well. The goal of this section
is to experimentally evaluate how many RR sets yield good estimates of the objective function in
practice.
16That is, I 6= ∅, and if S ∈ I, then S′ ∈ I whenever S′ ⊆ S.
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To do so, we ran experiments on the four networks from Section 5: Facebook , Advogato,
NetHEPT and DBLP . For every advertiser, we created independent influence networks as described
in Section 5. In our experiments, we varied the number of advertisersm from 1 to 20 and the number
of RR sets from mn to 100mn. For simplicity, we assumed that each advertiser j’s value function
is simply the (unscaled, and unbudgeted) number of nodes exposed to j’s ad.
The main idea is to obtain several independent estimates of the objective function by drawing
independent samples of RR sets. When the number of RR sets in each sample is large enough,
the estimates should be similar to each other according to different metrics, such as absolute error,
variance, etc.
B.1 Absolute Error
In the first set of experiments, we computed reference seed sets A(j)0 by running the Greedy algorithm
using 200mn RR sets for estimates.17
Having computed the seed sets A(j)0 , we estimated their payoff (for all advertisers) using different
numbers of RR sets. The absolute error of an estimate is the sum, over all advertisers, of the absolute
difference of the estimate using the 200mn RR sets and the estimate of the newly drawn RR sets.
In Figure 6, we plot the absolute error for all four networks, as we vary the number of RR sets
drawn. Each plot was obtained by averaging the absolute error over 100 independent draws of the
evaluation RR sets. We observe that for almost all network sizes n and numbers of advertisers m,
the error is less than 2% once ρ(j) ≥ 10n for all j; at that point, the error curve also nearly flattens
out.
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Figure 6: Absolute error in payoff estimation for different numbers of RR sets and advertisers m.
The x-axis plots the ratio between the total number of RR sets and mn.
B.2 Standard Deviation
As a second error measure, we considered the standard deviation. The experimental setup was
identical to the one in Section B.1. The only difference is that instead of the total absolute error,
in Figure 7, we plot the standard deviation of the estimations, normalized by the estimated mean.
The plots are nearly identical to those in Figure 6, confirming that our conclusions about esti-
mation errors are robust to the specific error measure used.
17Whether these were actually good seed sets is secondary, as we used them to measure the quality of the estimation
only. Running the Greedy algorithm ensured that we avoided trivial cases, such as accidentally choosing seed sets
with extremely small influence.
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Figure 7: Standard deviation of the estimated payoff, normalized by the mean, for different numbers
of RR sets and advertisers m. The x-axis plots the ratio between the total number of RR sets and
mn.
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Figure 8: Average payoff of selected seed set normalized by the payoff of seed set obtained with very
large number of RR sets (100mn). The x-axis plots the ratio of total number of RR sets and m ∗n.
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B.3 Impact on Optimization
In the third set of experiments, we analyzed the impact of the number of RR sets on the quality of
the seed sets selected by the Greedy algorithm. Unlike in Sections B.2 and B.1, the Greedy algorithm
was now run with a limited number of RR samples for estimation. (The number is specified as the
number of RR sets per advertiser.) In other words, the Greedy algorithm used estimates of higher
variance, and thus was expected to produce suboptimal seed sets. To evaluate the performance, we
normalized the objective value against the objective value that a Greedy algorithm using 100mn
RR sets would obtain.
Figure 8 plots the quality of the Greedy algorithm, normalized by the average payoff. Plots are
shown for all four networks and different values of m, and are averaged over 100 runs. We observe
that with a small number of RR sets, such as ρ(j) = n, the quality of the selected seed sets can be
quite poor, and the average payoff obtained can be 10–20% less than what can be achieved using
a larger number of RR sets, such as ρ(j) = 100n. This is because with small ρ(j), the estimation
errors are high; thus, the Greedy algorithm may overestimate the objective value of some seed sets
and underestimate the objective value of other seed sets.18
For almost all cases, when ρ(j) = 10n, the payoff achieved was at least 98% of the payoff with
100n RR sets per advertiser. As in Sections B.1 and B.2, the curves nearly flatten out for ρ(j) ≥ 10n.
Hence, we infer that empirically, about 10n RR sets per advertiser are sufficient to obtain very
accurate estimates of the objective function, and to guarantee that the greedy algorithm performs
almost as well as with much larger numbers of RR sets.
18Recall that payoffs were estimated with Reverse Reachability sets by computing the fraction of RR sets that
contain at least one of the nodes from the seed set.
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